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Abstract: Research on elites often utilizes network analysis to describe and analyze 
the interrelationships among elites and how their prominence varies by 
demographic characteristics. We examine the diversity of global elites through an 
analysis of the board members of large corporations, think tanks, international 
organizations, and transnational policy planning groups. Using new data, we 
provide the first descriptive picture of global elite networks in terms of race and 
gender. We also test the ‘core-periphery’ hypothesis, which predicts that as non-
whites and women achieve elite positions they will be marginalized to the periphery 
of elite networks, while the core remains significantly more white and male. We find 
consistent evidence for the core-periphery hypothesis across a range of empirical 
tests, from simple k-coring to various core-periphery models. Most groups decline 
in their representation in the core, and this includes white women. White men are 




Knowledge about elites is important in a world of vast inequality, where power and resources are 
highly centralized among a few individuals. For instance, individuals who serve on the boards of 
large and consequential organizations make discretionary choices that impact how society is 
ultimately governed. The composition of elites at a given time thus reflects what kinds of 
preferences and worldviews will be represented in decision-making. When it comes to elites in 
official political office, this relationship is widely accepted. Yet the board members of large 
corporations set corporate policies and oversee the production of goods and services that sustains 
 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Audrey Kearney, Kathrine Esten, Marco Garofalo, Jamil  
Siddiqui, Trace Dodge, Timothy Scalona, Iza Frachette and Joseph Wenzel. This project is supported by a 
Research Support Grant by the UMass Amherst College of Social and Behavioral Sciences (CSBS) and an 
Institute for Diversity Science (IDS) seed grant. We are grateful to Meredith Loken, Eleonora Mattiacci, and 
Signe Predmore for feedback on this paper. This paper has been presented previously at the Five Colleges 
International Relations (FCIR) colloquia, Amherst, as well as the Political Networks annual conference, Duke 
University. 
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the global economy. The board members of large think tanks and foundations heavily inform 
which ideas will be investigated, which will be treated seriously by the mainline intelligentsia, which 
lines of inquiry will be funded, and thus where knowledge will best develop and where it will not. 
International organizations govern relationships between states, regulate markets, and generate 
global public policy.  
 
Because board membership is ubiquitous across different types of organizations, these 
memberships forge ties across organizations, which allows us to examine interrelationships among 
elites that govern these organizations. Board ties link organizations together through their governing 
personnel – a board member for General Motors who also sits on the board of the Brookings 
Institution and the Gates Foundation can act as a mediator between these organizations and transfer 
information and social cues between them. While the majority of prior work has been focused on 
the corporate world (Fennema and Heemskerk 2018; Murray 2017), recent research has also 
investigated connections through a range of different employment ties across organizations 
(Young et al. 2017; Ellersgaard et al. 2013; Carroll and Sapinsky 2010; Seabrooke and Tsingou 
2014). For example, a range of empirical studies find that national elite ties make a difference to 
strategies of political action (Useem 1984), that Europe-wide ties impact aspects of European 
governance (Carroll, Fennema, and Heemskerk 2010), and even that transnational board ties of 
corporations inform political strategies at the national level (Murray 2014; Murray 2017; Chu and 
Davis 2016; Luther-Davies et al. 2020). 
 
This paper examines the gender and racial diversity of global elites. This is done through an 
empirical examination of the board members of the organizations that govern much of global 
resource allocation, power, policymaking, governance, and public discourse: large corporations, 
prestigious think tanks, international organizations, and transnational policy planning groups. We 
go beyond extant analyses to study the interrelationships among elites—that is, the dynamics of their 
social networks, based on ties across board memberships. Prior studies focus almost entirely on 
simple ‘headcounts’ of diversity, thus neglecting important questions about how elites are 
connected to one another through a complex network of board connections. This is important 
because even if racial and gender minorities achieve leadership positions, they may be marginalized 
to the periphery of elite networks, giving them substantially less influence in the decision-making 
process.  
 
Our aim is twofold. First, we provide the first descriptive account of the race and gender 
composition of the global elite – one that can inform other analyses and prove useful to other 
researchers and engaged parties. Second, we evaluate the core-periphery hypothesis, which predicts that 
as non-whites and women achieve elite positions they will be relatively marginalized to the 
periphery of elite networks, while the core remains more white and more male.  
 
In what follows below we first outline why the composition of global elite networks is important 
to study empirically. Second, we explain how our study advances current understanding of diversity 
within global elite networks, how it extends the existing literature, and present our hypotheses. 
Third, we outline our research methods, which involve constructing a variety of network measures 
based on the boards of many large and consequential organizations. Our analysis is described in 
section four, and includes descriptive statistics making use of a variety of core-periphery 
distinctions within these networks. We find strong and consistent evidence for the core-periphery 
hypothesis across different forms of measurement: as one moves from the periphery to the core 
of the global elite network, the proportion of white males increases, while all other groups analyzed 




1. Why the Diversity of Global Elite Networks Matters 
 
 
Why does the diversity of global elite networks matter? We offer four distinct reasons. First, the 
background of individuals has the potential to inform their governing behavior. A challenge to 
this notion might be that organizations themselves, or various ‘systemic’ pressures, inevitably 
produce the behavior needed. Yet, several recent high quality studies suggest that the composition 
of leaders matter, even within organizations facing strong systemic imperatives (Marple 2020; 
Seabrooke and Henriksen 2017), such as in global policy contexts including how the IMF operates 
(Seabrooke and Nilsson 2015; Nelson 2014; Chwieroth 2013; Kentikelenis and Seabrooke, 2017), 
military decisions and foreign policy (Horowitz and Stam 2014; Barceló 2018), nuclear 
proliferation (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2014), and democratization (Gift and Krcmaric 2017). 
 
Second, diversity may affect organizational performance. For example, greater gender diversity on 
corporate boards is associated with positive effects to organizational performance (Sabatier 2015; 
Soares et al 2015). Racial and gender diversity within corporate management appears to enhance 
the financial performance of firms (Richard et al. 2013), and a range of effects of diverse 
management of organizations exist (Wu et al 2019; Li and Chen 2018). 
 
A third reason why the composition of elites matters is because the diversity of global elites affects 
issues of representation and legitimacy of large and powerful organizations. The representation of 
different race or ethnic groups within national political systems is a contentious political issue in 
many societies, in particular when these factors cluster around wealth and income. Racial 
representation within the U.S. court system, for example, affects perceptions of its legitimacy, 
albeit in complex ways (see Scherer and Curry 2010); within universities (see Thomas 2020; 
Warikoo 2016), racial representation is a major issue leading to a variety of institutional changes. 
Concerns of representation are particularly salient for organizations that operate with global reach. 
If an international organization has a mandate to secure some public good for literally the entire 
human population and yet has an executive leadership that is racially homogenous, modern values 
of representativeness may mean the weakening of this organization’s legitimacy. Within 
international organizations, legitimacy is a major theme and ongoing dilemma (Dietz et al 2019; 
Bexell 2014). Who is represented on the governing bodies of international organizations, for 
instance, is often seen as one of the most crucial metrics for assessing its ability to carry out 
fundamentally ‘global’ public policy functions (see Zuern 2018; Hale et al 2013; Held and Young 
2013). As such, there are now widespread movements under way to address gender and racial 
diversity within large and consequential organizations, in particular in the corporate world but not 
confined to it, across the globe (see Alliance for Board Diversity and Deloitte 2019; Alliance for 
Board Diversity 2013).  
 
Fourth, knowledge about how global elites operate as a social network is valuable in the context 
of ongoing economic globalization and the changing distribution of wealth it has brought. If the 
composition of the executive leadership of large and consequential organizations is important, 
then the social dynamics of elites are by necessity consequential. The operating assumption of the 
study of elite networks is that elites interact with one another not just within organizations but 
across many organizations. These multiple ties are consequential, not just because they exist but 
because they are variable and unequal – a major analytical point reinforced by elite network analysis 
since its inception (Fennema and Heemskerk 2018). 
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A key question within the study of elite networks is how these forms of interaction adapt to 
change, and in particular how the balance of behaviors reflecting in-group solidarity with norms 
of inclusion operate. Within the United States, for example, major studies of elite networks 
emphasize the importance not just of being male and of being white, but of being Protestant 
(Baltzell 1966; Baltzell 1984). Yet groups that were systematically excluded made their way into 
elite circles through various professional and social movement struggles over time. The incumbent 
group in the U.S. – white, Protestant males – adapted to social change and pressure through 
selective inclusion of some marginalized groups, albeit in different and partial ways. Importantly, 
different groups that were previously excluded have had radically different trajectories – as 
emphasized by studies of women (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006), Blacks (Zweigenhaft and 
Domhoff 1991) and Jews (Zweigenhaft 1982). 
 
Over the last several decades, the center of global elite networks has been more or less stably 
oriented around one region of the world: the North Atlantic. This has meant that the privileged 
social group of the North Atlantic – that is, white, educated males who speak fluent English – has 
had enormous advantages. The accelerated rise of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s made inclusion of 
Japanese corporate elites a paramount concern for elites of the North Atlantic and groups such as 
the Trilateral Commission (Luna and Valasco 2017; Sklar 1980) were established to include 
Japanese leaders into the ambit of the North Atlantic elite network. 
 
While globally the center of elite networks is oriented around the North Atlantic, the planet’s 
economic center of gravity is returning to its long-run equilibria in the East (Wile 2012; Quah 2011). 
While this is associated with phenomena such as the re-emergence of Chinese economic 
prominence, and South and East Asian economic prominence generally, there are several 
indications that such a transformation informs elite sociality. According to the World Inequality 
Database, the proportion of super-rich – the 0.001% of the global population – have gotten 
unambiguously more Chinese, more Indian, and less European than in the past. In the largest 
study of transnational corporate interlocks to date, Heemskerk and Takes (2016) find evidence for 
a separate ‘East Asian’ cluster within the global network. De Graaf and Van Appeldoorn’s (2018, 
2017) analysis suggests that the Sino-Chinese relationship, and its mediation through elite 
networks, is not just becoming a major issue in international politics because China is important, 
but also because of differential integration of elites into global networks of power. 
 
There are of course important demographic shifts occurring within national societies as well, to say 
nothing of the way that greater gender and racial diversity efforts have been a part of ongoing 
social movement activity. Both demographic shifts and social movement efforts to change norms 
and policies around inclusion and diversity have been prominent within the North Atlantic in 
particular and their impact has deeply informed contemporary politics, both in terms of progress 
toward racial and gender diversity, and in terms of populist (counter)reactions to this diversity and 
its perceived effects. Yet there is very little that we know about the state of diversity among the 
global elite, although there is some interesting progress on the study of elite demographics in 
general, as we describe below. 
 
 
2. Approaches to Studying Diversity Among Elites 
 
While dynamics of racial and gender discrimination within society at large are now heavily studied 
terrain, the study of these dynamics among powerful people like elites is very rare. Within the 
contemporary study of elites, there is a dearth of understanding regarding how social dynamics 
such as race and gender norms of inclusion and exclusion operate. Prior research has focused 
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primarily on measuring changing diversity within the so-called ‘power elite,’ in particular on the 
leaders of large U.S. corporations (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006, 2011, 2018). Other analyses 
have examined the inclusion, over time, of particular minority groups. These include longitudinal 
studies of minority groups such as Jews (Zweigenhaft 1982), Blacks (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 
2003), and women (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker 2018) within the boards and CEO-suite of the 
U.S. corporate world. These studies, and others like them (Deloitte 2017; Catalyst 2016; 
Hagendorff and Keasey 2012; Martin and Herrero 2018; Mayer, Warr and Zhao 2018; Domhoff 
and 2011), share three primary limitations. First, they measure diversity only with counts of the 
total number of minority group members in organizational leadership positions. Second, the 
organizations they examine are – almost without exception – corporations. And third, these studies 
are U.S.-centric, and thus largely neglect organizations in the rest of the world.  
 
Our project significantly extends prior analyses in several ways, beginning with analyses that go 
beyond just the corporate world and into a broader organizational terrain, in acknowledgement of 
the array of organizations that reflect elite sociality (Khan 2012; Young et al. 2017; Carroll and 
Sapinsky 2010). In addition to examining the top corporations in the world, we study a range of 
organizations, including think tanks, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and transnational policy planning groups.  
 
Race and gender have been analyzed among elites, though only in a few exemplary studies. In 
particular, Domhoff and Zweigenhaft’s studies (2011, 2016) have examined multiple dimensions 
of expanded and differentiated elite inclusion, and provide the building blocks for analysis of the 
kind we are conducting here. Yet we are aware of only one existing study that has ventured into 
the terrain of assessing diversity within the global elite. This is the work by Zieliński (2017), which 
analyzed the race and gender composition of the Trilateral Commission over time. The Trilateral 
Commission is a very important transnational policy planning group, and we include it in our 
analysis. However, it is also only one of ten transnational policy planning groups that have been 
part of broader studies (Carroll and Sapinski 2010). An advantage of Zieliński’s study is that it 
utilizes Trilateral Commission conference attendance over time. While Zieliński (2017) only offers 
simple counts and a few paragraphs, they do find that women and non-whites are generally 
excluded from the inner circle of the Trilateral Commission, which is defined as those that have 
attended at least 16 conferences.  
 
We use network analysis because it allows us to establish how emergent social structures develop 
out of complex relationships between elites. The notion of an elite ‘core’ or, as it is sometimes 
known, an ‘inner circle’ (Useem 1984) is a keystone concept within the study of elite networks 
(Larsen and Ellersgaard 2018), and one we make use of in this context. The core or inner circle is 
essentially the group of individuals who not only have superordinate control over resources at 
their command (all elites generally qualify for this) but who also occupy an especially prominent 
place within elite social networks. The inner circle is believed to help maintain the class identity of 
the elite. Serving on multiple corporate boards meant that the interests of one’s business 
operations as a manager of particular capital – e.g. Walmart – was moderated by the interest of 
capital in general (Scott 1985). It also served to moderate (Useem 1984; Mizruchi 2013) corporations’ 
political roles, since the inner circle participants held moderate and pragmatic political views close 
to the average preferences of the network, and thus protected the status-quo. Individuals within 
the inner circle are much more likely to coordinate their political activities than those within the 
periphery – a finding that has shown to be robust historically in qualitative studies, in longitudinal 
studies, and at both the national and global levels of elite sociality (Murray 2014; Mizruchi 2013; 
Chu and Davis 2016). 
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Using the inner circle concept, core-periphery distinctions are made empirically to distinguish, 
usually qualitatively, those with inner circle status (the core elites) from those without (the peripheral 
elites). This has been done in many prior studies, including those of global elites (Carroll and 
Sapinsky 2010; Murray 2017). Numerous studies have used core-periphery distinctions to study 
corporate interlock ties in specific countries as well. For example, recently Comet (2017) examined 
the core-periphery structure of the policy-planning network in France; Naudet and Dubost (2017) 
do the same for Indian corporate ties; Chu and Davis (2016) examine the evolving disappearance 
of the inner circle in the United States, and Larsen and Ellersgaard (2017) examine the inner circle 
of the Danish elite.   
 
We assess how proportionately representative different race and gender groups are within the 
global elite. We expect white males to be the most well-represented ‘incumbent population’ within 
global elite circles. Theoretically, mechanisms of in-group solidarity might be strongest within the 
‘core’ of the network, where incumbent white male leaders have enjoyed a position of historic 
dominance. Establishing the ‘core’ of a network distinct from the ‘periphery’ is extremely useful 
because it conforms to notions of social exclusion and insider-ism that pervade social life. On the 
basis of mechanisms of race-based social exclusion (Royster 2003; Althauser et al 1975), one can 
easily imagine that, for example, predominantly white male social networks marginalize blacks 
(Zweigenhft 2003) or treat East Asian females differently. At the same time, there may be 
incentives for ‘tokenism’ within corporate boards, other strategic considerations (Heemskerk and 
Fennema 2014), or changing norms within elite strata that countervail a white male incumbency 
advantage, and we acknowledge that the dynamics of race and employment are not straightforward 
(Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006). 
 
While it is plausible that the demographic and geopolitical shifts mentioned above will change the 
shape of elite networks, it is also possible that the inner circle of elites will not change in the face of 
these shifts. Indeed, resilience of corporate networks has been found in previous research in the face 
of dramatic changes to corporate structure. Davis, Yoo and Baker (2003) examine the relationship 
between elite network structure and corporate governance change over time (looking at 1982, 1990 
and 1999 in the U.S. specifically), and find that the structure of the U.S. corporate elite has been 
resilient to changes affecting corporate governance. 
 
We acknowledge that corporate organization, and thus the network properties of the corporate elite, 
varies significantly across countries (Scott 1991). There exists a range of literature on corporate 
networks outside of Europe and North America, such as work by De Graaf (2019, 2014) on 
Chinese elites, Cardenas (2016) which compares elite networks across Latin America, and Murray’s 
(2006) work on elite networks in New Zealand and Australia. Schoettli and Pohlmann (2017) 
provide an analysis of economic elites in India and their integration within transnational networks. 






2 For example, Conyon and Muldoon (2006) examine the properties of corporate board networks in the US, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. They compare a variety of network properties to random networks and 
find these board interlock networks to be not substantially different from random networks when it comes to 
how ‘clubby’ these networks are. They do however find positive degree correlation among corporate board 
members, meaning that board members on multiple boards tend to be connected to those with others who also 
sit on many boards. 
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3. Constructing a Global Elite Network 
 
To study global elite networks we need a collection of people to study. To establish this population, 
we follow extant research in this area that suggests we can start with a collection of globally 
powerful organizations to arrive at such a population. While corporate boards are the primary way 
in which global elite networks have been studied, the majority of theorizing about how elite power 
reproduces itself suggests a range of large and consequential organizations, through which 
individuals of exceptionally high social standing circulated (e.g. Mills 1956; Bourdieu 1996). 
Seabrooke and Henriksen (2020, this issue) note that elites in transnational policy networks are 
those that have disproportionate influence over policy design and implementation on issues of 
global importance.  This includes an array of occupational positions, but surely includes the board 
members of large and consequential organizations beyond just corporations. Existing scholarship 
has sometimes examined the interface of corporate boards and selected policy planning 
organizations (Carroll and Sapinski 2010; Carroll and Carson 2003; Sapinsky 2015).  
 
For our sample, we go further to include a wider array of organizations that are involved in 
governance, that control resources, and that are globally prominent. Because there is no clearly 
established population of organizations, we select an informed group that we describe below: large 
corporations, think tanks, international organizations, transnational policy planning groups, and 
non-governmental organizations. Our approach self-consciously departs from a Bourdieusian 
approach in which elites are defined in field-specific ways. 
 
Large corporations are undoubtedly consequential organizations and so are included. We select a top 
list of global corporations in the following way. Ranks in terms of total revenue, rather than assets, 
is sometime preferred, because ranking by total assets yields mostly large financial institutions. 
Thus, an approach we will adopt, following precedent in other studies (Carroll and Sapinsky 2010; 
Stokman et al. 1985), is to have two thirds non-financial firms ranked by revenue and then the 
largest financial firms ranked by assets. We include 30 corporations – 20 non-financial and 10 
financial. A larger sample of corporations is of course possible, and we acknowledge that most 
purely corporate board interlock studies have a larger sample of corporations. Yet any cut-off is 
inherently arbitrary, and this study includes an array of different organizations beyond 
corporations. Given a known distribution of corporation size in the global economy by assets or 
revenue (Young 2015), the 30 corporations included are likely fairly representative.   
 
Our study includes globally influential think tanks due to the prominent role they play in the 
formation of ideas and policymaking (Salas-Porras and Murray 2017; Rich 2004). Moreover, their 
outputs – in the form of research and advocacy strategies – are used by other powerful 
organizations and individuals. Think tanks produce, nurture, and promote public intellectuals 
(Misztal 2012); they contribute to policy advisory systems (Fraussen and Halpin 2017); their 
activities frequently have global influence on social and economic policy (Dabrowski 2014; 
McGann, Viden and Rafferty 2014; Shoup 2015), and the work of think tanks often brings together 
corporate and government officials (McGann 2016; Garsten 2014), often across transnational 
networks (Struyk 2002). We selected the most prestigious 30 think tanks in the world, using the 
‘Global Go To Think Tank Index’ (McGann 2018).3  
 
3 This is a league table produced by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the Lauder 
Institute at the University of Pennsylvania.3 This is a widely used index that has been vetted in several stages to 
ensure rigor. In a first stage, a call for nominations is sent to approximately 6,500 think tanks and 7,500 
journalists, public and private donors, and policy makers from around the world. Those organizations that 
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An influential yet often overlooked set of organizations that we include are transnational policy 
planning groups, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Economic Forum, the 
Trilateral Commission, and other organizations that operate as coordination hubs for business, 
government, and think-tank organizations. These policy planning groups have played an important 
role in formulating policies for global governance (Zieliński 2017; Carroll and Sapinsky 2010; 
Carroll and Carson 2003). The Trilateral Commission, for example, has brought together 
government leaders, business executives, and leaders of prominent think tanks since the 1970s to 
guide policy agendas around the world (Luna and Valasco 2017; Sklar 1980). Several prior studies 
attempt to utilize the membership data of just one of these organizations. In Zieliński (2017) the 
focus is on the Trilateral Commission; in Luther-Davies et al. (2020) the Council of Foreign 
Relations is used as the key indicator of U.S. elites’ connection to the policy planning network. We 
include the boards of the 10 most prominent transnational policy-planning boards with global 
reach, a list established by existing scholarship (Carroll and Sapinsky 2010)4￼  and thus not subject 
to our own discretionary choice, in terms of number of organizations.  
 
To represent public organizational groups at the international level, we include the governing 
boards of 6 major international organizations that represent the major public-sector entities operating 
under the guise of global governance.5 These are different than transnational policy planning groups, 
which are essentially private club organizations. We also include a variety of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), specifically the top 10 that were globally ranked in 2015 (the closest date we 
could obtain to the present at the time of our data collection)6￼  
 
The boards of all these organizations were collected for the year 2018. We found lists of board 
members through annual reports of organizations, and we found extended connections of these 
 
obtain 10 or more nominations are then placed in an electronic ranking survey, with a final list generated 
through this process and finally adjudicated by an expert panel to make final selections. 
4 These include the International Chamber of Commerce, the Bilderberg Conference, the Trilateral Commission, 
the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Business Council on Sustainable Development, the UN Global 
Compact, the European Round Table of Industrialists, the EU-Japan Business Round Table, TransAtlantic 
Business Dialogue. We also include, contra Carroll and Sapinsky (2010), the Group of 30, an important private 
club composed of public officials and private sector individuals developing agendas for international economic 
affairs (Tsingou 2015). The North American Competitiveness Council, which Carroll and Sapinsky (2010) also 
use, is no longer in operation. The Council on Foreign Relations is defined as a think tank for our study and is 
thus not included in this group.  
5 Specifically, we include the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank (specifically the IBRD), the Chair and Bureau of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives of the UN Environment Program (UNEP), the senior representatives of the UN Security 
Council, and the governing Executive Committee of the UN High Commission on Refugees. We also include 
the UN ‘Chief Executives Board for Coordination’, which is composed of the Executive Heads of the UN, it’s 
12 Funds and Programs, the 15 Specialized Agencies of the UN, it’s 3 ‘Related Organizations’, and is chaired by 
the UN Secretary-General.  
6  These include Medicines San Frontieres, BRAC, Danish Refugee Council, the Grameen Foundation, 
ACUMEN Fund, Oxfam, Partners in Health, Islamic Relief International, Save the Children, and World Vision. 
This top list was constructed by a global study of NGOs, called NGO Advisor (formerly GlobalGeneva), which 
has maintained a distinct methodology for ranking global NGOs, developed by Jean-Christophe Nothias, former 
editor in chief of The Global Journal. An NGO was defined as “operational or advocacy-focused nonprofit 
organizations” that focus on the public interest and are nonprofit organizations. Nothias began a ranking 
methodology in 2009, which underwent a commissioned academic review in 2013 (Cannon 2013) and is also 
subject to critique within the NGO community itself (in the same way that university rankings are contentious, 
for example). The ranking process involves a public codebook, and involves a survey of over 2000 NGOs 
worldwide, excludes business interest NGOs (such as business associations). 
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individuals through their websites, web searches, and other information aggregators such as 
Bloomberg, Wikipedia, and Capital IQ. The organizations are a ‘top slice,’ not a probabilistic 
sample, so they represent an informed, curated sample of the largest and most prestigious 
organizations, with an over-representation of global corporations due to their centrality in global 
elite networks. The list constitutes 96 different organizations, of varying sizes, capacities and 
remits. One potential critique is that we overrepresent organizations based in certain regions of 
the world.  However, the fact is that the most powerful organizations in the world are 
headquartered in a limited number of regions: the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, and increasingly, 
China.7 This is an important and concerning finding in itself. The majority of the organizations 
nonetheless have a global remit and are not focused on any particular country or region. For 
example, Amnesty International is headquartered in the U.K., the World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development in Switzerland, and BRAC in Bangladesh, but all have offices across the 
world and all deal with fundamentally ‘global’ issues that stretch far beyond their headquartered 
countries. 
 
We are conscious that our sample population is drawn from the governance of organizations – 
that is, ‘organizational leaders’. Consequently, other categories of elite status – such as extreme 
wealth or other forms of prestige and social connection – may be absent from this sample, 
inasmuch as some individuals with these characteristics do not govern the boards of organizations. 
Yet our study should also be seen in the context of the vast majority of exercises to examine 
transnational class formation or global elite networks that focus, usually exclusively, on corporate 
board members and/or CEOs only. Our inclusion of a range of large and consequential 
organizations, that constitute an array of governance practices, represent a far more encompassing 





From the population of board members of organizations described above, we generated a list of 
approximately 1600 individuals governing these 96 organizations circa 2018. We first build a 
network composed of all the board members of only the organizations described above, which we 
call the ‘base’ organizational network. Although the ‘base’ organizational network provides a more 
complete depiction of the board ties in our original sample, it likely underrepresents the array of 
actual ties that elites have to one another. We then searched for the ties of these individuals outside 
the organizations originally sampled.8  
 
We conducted a variety of quality control checks following the best practice standards (Heemskerk 
et al. 2018). In particular, we conducted checks on entity resolution (Marple et al. 2018) using 
sorted lists of organizations and names, and looking up organizations when names were 
ambiguous. While we are confident that we searched thoroughly for all available board ties for 
these individuals, and we performed several reliability checks along the way, there is likely some 
 
7 Relatedly, we note that several studies of corporate elites within Europe and within Latin America have found 
a lack of evidence of significant transnational ties relative to national ones (Vion et al. 2015; Cardenas 2014). 
8 The extended organizational network is different because it contains all of the board memberships of the base 
organizational network but, in addition, also contains an expanded list of other connections of each individual in 
our population. Thus, while for example while ‘John Smith’ may be on the board of the World Economic Forum 
(which is part of our ‘base’ group of organizations) we also found that he was on the board of Harvard University, 
Exxon Mobil, and the Japanese Association of Manufacturers. While the latter three organizations were not on 
our base-organization list, they are relevant for establishing connections between elites, and they may prove to 
be direct ties or part of connected pathways between elites. 
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degree of error nonetheless. It is also inevitable that some ties to non-base organizations exist but 
were not found.  
 
Table 1 summarizes these networks. Nodes include the individuals and organizations in the 2-
mode network, while an edge connects an individual to an organization. Table 1 suggests a 
tradeoff: the Base Organizational Network is more complete, while the Extended Organizational 
Network is more representative of the larger population. We include a number of simple network 
level statistics of each network for comparison and because they may be useful to other researchers 









Number of individuals 1590 1590 
Number of nodes 1683 6735 
Number of edges 1650 9176 
Density 0.017 0.039 
Average Path Length 3.430 2.640 
Modularity 0.917 0.514 
Transitivity 0.931 0.601 
 
 
Race was coded using standardized headshot pictures collected for each individual in the sample. 
Coding race is complicated first by the fact that perceptions of an individual’s race vary by the 
surrounding contexts (Simon and Piche 2012; Roth 2016). Second, racial categories are subjective. 
There is no underlying property conforming to what most people mean by race, especially across 
different national and regional contexts (Roth 2017). Existing scholarship that has coded the race 
of U.S. elites defines race in fewer categories than we employ, for example treating both South 
Asian and East Asian individuals under the category ‘Asian’ (Zweigenhaft and Riplinger 2011). 
Other scholarship outside of the U.S. has used categories that may be appropriate for a given local 
context but not globally. For example, Murray (2001) used ‘Anglo South African’, Black, Afrikaans, 
Jewish, and Indian as their categories for the board members of South African organizations. After 
examining a variety of racial categorization methods used in different parts of the world, we opted 
for the most generalizable categories that could be reliably coded. Table 2 below lists the racial 
categories as well as their percentages in the sample of organizational leaders. We ran inter-coder 
reliability checks on the classification of our sample population, using a random sample of the 
standardized headshots of 400 individuals, and found inter-coder reliability to be high, using both 







9 Specifically, with 6 categories and 2 coders, raw agreement was 86.5%, while Cohen’s unweighted kappa score 
was 75%, and Gwet’s AC value was 84.5%. The highest level of raw disagreement was between White and 
Hispanic categories. Revising to just 5 categories across the two coders yielded raw agreement of 95%, with 
Cohen’s kappa value of 89.2% and Gwet’s AC at 94.3%. Both of these analyses suggest that agreement was stable 
across coders, but we recognize that perceptions of race categorization are themselves contested (Brown et al 





Race Category % Sample % of which 
Men 
% of which 
Women 
Black   6.6 62.9 37.1 
East Asian 11.3 85.5 14.5 
Hispanic   2.3 81.1 18.9 
Middle Eastern   2.3 73.7 26.3 
South Asian   4.3 76.8 23.2 




% of Total 
Sample 
Black Women 2.45% 
Black Men 4.15% 
East Asian Women 1.64% 
East Asian Men 9.63% 
Hispanic Women 0.44% 
Hispanic Men 1.89% 
Middle Eastern Women 0.63% 
Middle Eastern Men 1.76% 
South Asian Women 1.01% 
South Asian Men 3.34% 
White Women 18.57% 
White Men 54.5% 
 
 
Gender is not a simple binary variable, and is also a multifaceted social construct. Because we do 
not know an individual’s own gender identity, we chose to classify binary gender based on our 
perceptions of each elite’s gender through their headshots. Although we cannot know how well 
our perceptions coincide with the individuals’ self-identification, it is outsider perceptions that 
most likely inform treatment of those individuals in their professional life. Employing a binary 
gender categorization is also imperfect given the multitude of gender identities to which people 
adhere. Unfortunately, the challenge of coding transgender and non-binary identities is beyond the 
scope of this study. Our sample is overwhelmingly male and white: males are 75.3% of the sample 
and whites are 73.1% of the sample. 
 
While these initial descriptive findings are interesting, our primary focus is how race and gender 
are related to the structure of elite networks. In what follows, we first conduct a k-coring exercise 
to examine how the representation of different groups changes across the network. We then 
deploy a variety of core-periphery models on the network to assess whether and how different 
groups are represented on the core compared to the periphery. 
 
 
Step 1: K-Coring in 2-Mode Network 
 
We first analyze how race and gender representation changes among more highly-connected parts 
of the network at different levels of k-core decomposition. A k-core of a network is composed of 
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all of the nodes that continue to be included in a network, when only those with at least k 
connections are included (Seidman 1983; Batageli and Zavernik 2002). It is the ‘sub-graph’ where 
all nodes have a degree of at least k. For example, to construct the 4-core of a network, one first 
eliminates all nodes with 3 or fewer connections; this in turn leaves some nodes with fewer than 
4 connections, so the process is iterated until those that remain have at least 4 connections each. 
For our 2-mode network of individuals and organizations, the resulting 4-core would include the 
maximal set of individuals who are on the boards of 4 or more organizations in the 4-core, which 
in turn have at least 4 board members within this set. This structural characteristic of a k-core 
represents a highly interconnected elite set of individuals and organizations. We focus on the 
individuals in each k-core from k=1 (the original network of 1590 individuals) to the highest k the 
network will decompose to. For the base organizational network, the maximum k-core is 2, which 
contains 43 highly interconnected individuals, and for the extended organizational network the 
maximum is a 4-core, which is comprised of 151 individuals.  
 
Figure 1 
Race and Gender Representation by K-Core Decomposition 
 
Base Organizational Network 
 
 




As the network is ‘k-cored’, we assess how the representation of different groups changes. Our 
findings suggest that white males are not only the dominant group in the network, but that their 
representation increases as the k-core increases. In the base organizational network, their 
representation increases from 57% in the 1-core to 72% in the 2-core network. In the extended 
organizational network, white males increase from 60% in the 1-core network to 70% in the 4-
core network. In other words, as we move from the periphery toward the more densely 
interconnected ‘core’, the network becomes even more strongly dominated by white men. White 
women are the second highest represented group in the extended organizational network at 
18.57% of the total, but their representation notably declines as the k-core increases, down to 
13.74% in the 4-core. These differences between white men and women suggest that it is not race 
alone that drives the social organization of the network, but a combination of race (whiteness) and 
gender (maleness). 
 
The situation for non-white categories of elites is more complex. Within the base-organizational 
network, the presence of all such individuals, whether male or female, decreases as the k-core 
increases. For the extended organizational network, this is still true from the 1-core to the 4-core, 
although there is some marginal increases in representation from the 3-core to the 4-core, in the 
case of Black men and East Asian men, for example. Herein the small number of individuals in 
some categories raises a double-edge sword. On the one hand, smaller numbers mean a lower 
confidence in observed variance. Yet on the other hand, the small number of individuals is itself 
indicative of the state of diversity among global elites. For example, while there are 69 South Asians 
in the network as a whole, there are only 3 in the 4-core network - and only one of them is a 
woman. While there are more Black individuals in the network, at 105, in the 4-core network there 
remain only 4, again with only 1 woman. 
 
This initial examination of our elite network, using simple k-coring methods, supports the core-
periphery hypothesis. Next, we turn to a more stringent series of tests for differentiating the 
periphery from the core to evaluate the robustness of these findings.  
 
 
Step 2: Core-Periphery Models in 1-Mode Network 
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A range of core measures aside from k-coring are available, but most are intended to be used with 
a 1-mode network, consisting only of interconnected individuals. Figure 2 illustrates our base and 
extended networks as 2-mode networks (first row) of individuals and organizations, and as 1-mode 
networks (second row) composed only of individuals. Organizations are shown in green and 
disappear in the 1-mode network where we remove edge color because of the greater density of 
ties to facilitate visualization. 
 
Projecting our 2-mode network (individuals and organizations) onto a 1-mode network (only 
individuals) entails a transformation of node-level attributes that count ties, since board size is not 
uniform across organizations.10 Collapsing a two-mode network to a one-mode network poses the 
risk of representing individuals on large boards as more highly connected than individuals on small 
boards, regardless of their degree of connectivity across organizations (Carroll and Sapinsky 2010). 
For this reason, we focus on core-periphery distinctions, which relate to differential prominence 
among sub-components of the network as a whole.11  
 
To address the issue of differential board size in the 1-mode network, we use a weighting method 
whereby multiple ties between individuals across organizations are worth more than a single tie 
between individuals within an organization. For example, two individuals that have common ties 
across four organizations have a weight of 4, while two individuals with ties within one 
organization (i.e. they are on the same board) have a weight of 1. In the instances where such edge 
weights are incorporated into a minimal distance path across the network, we invert this measure 
so that the stronger ties between individuals represent ‘less path’ to travel, while the weaker ties 




Visualizations of Elite Network, by Mode and Type 
 
 




10 While corporate boards vary in size, this is not usually by a great deal. For example, Berkshire Hathaway and 
Acumen have boards of 14, while JP Morgan and Barclays have boards of 15. Other types of organizations 
have either larger or smaller boards. The Council on Foreign Relations, however, has a board of 37 people, and 
the EU-Japan Business Roundtable has a board of 48 people, and UNESCO has a 6-person board. 
11 Weighting ties to normalize to the size of boards is another possibility, but it is fraught for two reasons. First, 
it entails strong assumptions about how less connected individuals are in a larger board versus a smaller one. We 
simply have no way of knowing, although future research may hold some promise on this property. Second, 
weighting to normalize to the size of boards is only possible in the base-organizational network setting, since the 
extended organizations are not necessarily composed of all board members, even though the base-organizations 
are, due to our method of data collection. For example, if Northrup Grumman is not on our base-organizational 
list, but 10 people are connected to it, it would appear that Northrup Grumman has a board of 10 individuals, 




1-Mode Base Organizational Network   1-Mode Extended Organizational Network 
 




A core-periphery structure in a network means that there are a set of core nodes which are densely 
interconnected, in contrast to peripheral nodes, which are more loosely interconnected. Our 
method of analysis with the 1-mode network is to assess whether the relative representation of 
different race and gender groups is different in the ‘core’ of the network compared to the 
periphery. If the core, for example, is more proportionally represented by whites than by non-
whites, then this would support our core-periphery hypothesis. Different methods are available 
for ascertaining a core-periphery structure of a network, and new innovations have been recently 
proposed (Cinelli et al 2017; Rombach et al 2017; Kojaku and Masuda 2018). We use three of these 
new measures to assess the consistency of our findings across methods. While we cannot 
adjudicate between these methods, a consistent finding that appears across methods would further 
suggest that is the patterns observed in the data are substantively present in the broader population 
of global elites. 
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The first is the ‘rich-core’ method developed by Ma and Mondragon (2015), which identifies the 
nodes in the hub of the network that play a dominating role in structural and functional properties.  
This method makes use of edge weights and thus is attractive because it incorporates the greater 
intensity of connection among some elites within organizations. The Ma and Mondragon 
algorithm is easily scalable to relatively large networks such as ours, and does not entail choices 
about parameters, with the exception of the edge weights that we incorporate. It has been used to 
analyze the core within the global trade network (Ma and Mondragon 2015), but we are not aware 
of it being applied to the study of elites.   
 
Second, we use the method of ‘network back-boning’, which is a process to filter non-significant 
edges from a very dense and noisy network such as ours. Back-boning preserves the edges that 
represent statistically significant deviations with respect to a null model for the local assignment 
of weights to edges (Serranno et al. 2009). It has been applied to the analysis of U.S. airport 
networks as well as natural systems such as food webs (Serranno et al. 2009). Like the other 
methods we deploy, it also incorporates the information from weighted edges to ascertain the 
backbone of the network. The only parameter for the ‘disparity filter’ algorithm it uses is the 
statistical significance level at which the model analyzes the data, which we set at the conventional 
5% p-value.12 
 
Third, we use the coring method developed to analyze elite networks by Larsen and Ellersgaard 
(2017), which has been used to study the Danish elite. Their ‘eliter’ method produces a score of 
‘coreness’ for all individuals in the network. This method has more discretionary steps than other 
methods but conforms extremely well to notions of an ‘inner circle’ within the study of elites. 
While some scholarship takes simpler measures of an inner circle on the basis of multiple ties ( 
Heerwig and Murray 2018; Murray 2017), Larsen and Ellersgaard utilize the structural properties 
of the network. A minimal distance path is computed between all individuals in the network,13 
then a score is attributed to those individuals who are able to ‘reach’ other individuals more 
efficiently than others. Because of the nature of this method, we used inverted edge weights, such 
that two individuals with multiple ties are defined as more easily ‘reachable’, while two individuals 
with a single tie are ‘less reachable’. Those that can reach one another very efficiently, based on 
the distance traveled along network paths, have a higher coreness score.14 This method produces 
a continuous measure of coreness, and defines the inner circle as those with the maximum 
coreness score. For our purposes, we take the 90th percentile of coreness scores to define the inner 
circle, although our results are similar when we use the maximum coreness scores. 
 
Figure 3 shows a series of results, using the extended network data, analyzed via the three 
different core-periphery models described above. These results illustrate that white men are 
 
12 For the backbone process for the refined (2-cored) base-organizational network, because this network was so 
small we had to increase the alpha level from .05 to .16 (which we found to be the lowest possible alpha value) 
in order for the model to generate a result.] 
13 Larsen and Ellersgaard (2017) also use an initial step of using betweenness decomposition to reduce ‘hangers-
on’ in the network before using this coreness method. We omit this initial step because we want to make our 
results broadly comparable across different methods. Furthermore, in the case of our analysis of the 2-core 
network, we don’t wish to conduct two methods of initial processing to reduce hangers-on in the network.   
14 This is subject to a ‘reach’ parameter, which we set at 6. Larsen and Ellersgaard set their reach parameter to 
2.1, however for our purposes such a low reach threshold can (under some conditions) exclude no one from 
the core. Our value is also higher because our use of inverted edge weights means that, compared to those 
individuals with multiple (‘weightier’) ties to one another, individuals with only single ties to one another are 
calculated to be more distant, as described above. 
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the only group with substantially higher representation in the core than the periphery. White 
women and almost all non-white groups are rarer in the core than the periphery. There are 
some notable exceptions, however – for example black women either hold the same level of 
representation in the core and periphery or else increase their representation in the core, 
although this varies across methods. In addition, the relative change for white women is very 




Representativeness of Different Groups in Periphery versus Core,  




To investigate the consistency of results across methods further, we analyze these data using 
the same three core-periphery methods but against different kinds of networks in addition to 
the extended organizational network as described immediately above. The second network we 
analyze is the much smaller base organizational network, consisting only of the ties between 
elites arising from board connections to organizations in the global top lists enumerated above. 
The third kind of network is the 2-core of the extended organizational network – that is, a 
reduced (‘sub-graph’) version of the extended organizational network in which only those 
individuals with 2 or more connections remain, after iteratively culling all those with at least 2 
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connections. 15  Analyzing the core-periphery composition from this network assesses the 
robustness of our findings against a less inclusive notion of ‘elite’ – for example in the case 
that not all organizational leaders are elites, but only those that are more connected (in this 
case, with a 2-core score and above). 
 
Because of the volume of results – 12 different race-gender categories, across 2 groups (core 
and periphery), using 3 different methods, with 3 different kinds of networks - we use a graphic 
depiction of change from the core to the periphery, averaged across the three core-periphery 
methods to depict our findings. Figure 5 provides a representation of each race-gender 
category in our data, with men depicted in blue and women in red, with each data point 
representing the level of level of representation in the periphery versus the core, according to 
each of the 3 different methods we deploy. The lines running from periphery to core columns 




Extended Organizational Network 
 
Base Organizational Network 
 
 
15 We tried analyzing the 2-core of the base organizational network, but the resultant network of only 32 
individuals yields a core of a very small group – in some cases smaller than the number of race and gender 
categories we have. 
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Extended Organizational Network, from 2-Core 
 
 
Table 3 provides a summation of our results, across these different networks. We find that for 
some groups, results are directionally consistent, while for others they are not. For example, 
for both Hispanic and South Asian men and women, representation declines from the 
periphery to the core. The same consistent result exists for East Asian women and for White 
women, which are less well-represented in the core compared to the periphery. The only 
consistent result which represents an increase in representation is for white men – the only 
group who are consistently better represented in the core than in the periphery. While some 
of the inconsistencies in other results may be related to small number of individuals in the 
sample (e.g. black women), this source of potential error is very unlikely for white men, who 
are the most abundantly represented group in the entire sample. 
 
Table 3 
Summary of Results Across Different Kinds of Networks,  
with Arrows Depicting Difference in Representation  
in the Core Compared to the Periphery 
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In this paper we have examined the diversity of global elites, using new data on the board members 
of a variety of organizations that govern much of global resource allocation, power, policymaking, 
governance, and public discourse: large corporations, prestigious think tanks, international 
organizations, NGOs, and transnational policy planning groups. While empirically estimating 
diversity among elites is not new, previous work has often been confined to corporations or large 
U.S.-only organizations.  
 
We evaluated the ‘core-periphery’ hypothesis, predicting that the ‘core’ of global elite networks 
have different race and gender representation than the ‘periphery’. These are network concepts 
that relate to longstanding notions of an ‘inner circle’ of concentrated power within the study of 
elites and their interrelationships. We found strong and consistent evidence in support of the core-
periphery hypothesis when it came to the largest incumbent group – white men. This was the only 
group in the categories of race and gender that had a consistently greater proportion of 
representation in the core compared to the periphery. For many other groups, representation was 
either inconsistent or consistently declined from the core to the periphery.  
 
While the global elite is dominated by white men, and even more so in the core than the periphery, a 
full and comprehensive interpretation of this finding is something we leave to further research. A 
large body of scholarship on racial homophily and on the operation of gender norms in 
professional life suggests that white men have historically engaged in behavior that marginalized 
racial minorities and women. Other elite attributes such as age, elite education, and skin tone are 
also known to act as markers of status within elite circles and may operate alongside race and 
gender to promote exclusionary dynamics.  
 
Our sample is based on a snapshot of organizations at a single point in time (2018), so an 
interesting question for future research is how the dynamics we identified may be changing. 
Numerous board diversity initiatives are under way in many countries, such as Norway and India, 
and this may have implications for racial and gender representation within global elite networks. 
So too may the changing geography of wealth, for example among the largest corporations and 
the wealthiest individuals in the world, which is likely to transform the shape of policy planning 
boards and international organizations in the years to come.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the only study of racial and gender dynamics within global elite networks 
across an array of organizations. The diversity of the global elite is relevant to many potential 
outcomes of interest, from organizational performance to legitimacy to governing behaviour. 
Moreover, knowledge about how global elites operate is valuable in the context of on-going 
economic globalization and the changing global distribution of wealth. We have not examined the 
consequences of elite diversity in this study, or for that matter examined the causal mechanisms 
that may underlie racial and gender dynamics within these networks. However, this first descriptive 
step toward understanding the extent and nature of diversity within global elite networks not only 
reveals the continued marginalization of racial minorities and women in the seats of decision-
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